This study investigates how access to political endorsements affects stated preferences for an environmental public good in Switzerland. We developed a contingent valuation survey questionnaire with two valuation questions, the first formulated as a (hypothetical) policy referendum, the second an open-ended WTP question. For the referendum question we solicited endorsements from a range of political parties and relevant interest groups. We then conducted a split-sample mail-survey experiment in which a table listing the endorsements was included with a subsample of the questionnaires. Access to the policy endorsements significantly affected the responses to the open-ended willingness-to-pay question.
Introduction
Laboratory experiments by psychologists and economists have produced a large body of evidence suggesting that individual preferences are inconsistent and unstable, and that the economic working rules may often not apply in the unfamiliar decision tasks presented in experimental settings. However, more recent experimental studies by economists have also shown that market forces can transform anomalies in preference patterns observed in the laboratory (e.g., Frey and Eichenberger, 1994) and that "learning" through institutions may promote consistent decision-making about private goods (Slembeck and Tyran, 2004) .
In choices about non-market goods and services, the power of market forces cannot be relied on by definition. If market settings are required for inducing individuals to make consistent choices, then the prospects for consistent individual decision-making about nonmarket goods are bleak. Indeed, recent research on the contingent valuation of public goods has replicated a variety of the choice anomalies that have been observed in laboratory experiments which did not induce strong market-like incentives. It is currently unclear how stable and consistent preferences for public goods could be generated and measured in a survey setting. This is particularly dissatisfactory given economists' increasing interest in nonmarket goods and services (McFadden 1999) .
However, political scientists have recently shown that voters in referenda use informational "shortcuts" to make decisions about complex issues that appear to be consistent with their interests and values. Specifically, they have shown that relatively uninformed voters who knew the positions of important interest groups were able to use this information to infer how a proposition would likely affect them (e.g. Lupia 1994 ). This finding suggests a novel approach to preference elicitation in surveys. Uncertain respondents in surveys may likewise choose -if given this option -to base their decisions on information shortcuts such as political endorsements from familiar parties, which may then restore the apparent rationality of their decisions about unfamiliar public goods.
In this paper we design an experiment to test if access to endorsements solicited from political parties and interest groups affects responses in a stated preference (contingent valuation) setting. We develop a survey questionnaire with two valuation questions, the first formulated as a (hypothetical) policy referendum, the second an open-ended WTP question. For the referendum question we solicit endorsements from a range of political parties and relevant interest groups. We then conduct a split-sample mail-survey experiment in which a table listing the endorsements is included with a subsample of the questionnaires.
The rationale of this specific setup is as follows. In the control treatment without political endorsements, the tax costs specified in the referendum question represent an arbitrary "anchor"
for the subsequent open-ended willingness-to-pay question. In contrast, in the treatment with endorsements, the tax costs together with the endorsements carry potentially important information which respondents may use to find their responses to both the referendum question and the open-ended WTP question. The experiment is therefore a test of whether replacing arbitrary anchors by informative signals affects stated preferences for public goods. If the answer is yes, then informative, non-arbitrary signals may have the potential to "crowd out" the undesired effects of arbitrary anchors -and thus promote consistent patterns in stated preferences for public goods. In addition, by experimentally varying the tax costs in the referendum question, it is possible to test if the effect of the information treatment is an effect of the presence of political endorsements per se, or if it depends on the specific proposition for which the endorsements are provided.
We find that access to political endorsements in our stated preference survey setting strongly reduced the frequency of non-responses in the open-ended WTP question. Moreover, the information signals in interaction with the specified tax costs significantly affected open-ended WTP for the proposed policy. These findings suggest that providing access to political signals has the potential to reduce anomalies in stated choices about public goods.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section briefly reviews relevant literature and presents the experimental design and hypotheses. Section 3 presents the results, Section 4 contains the discussion, and Section 5 concludes.
Background, Experimental Design and Hypotheses
Experimental psychologists have long established that individual judgements about unfamiliar goods and experiences are highly sensitive to framing (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1968) . In responding to experimental stimuli individuals use simplified heuristics, and their responses may contain largely arbitrary components (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984) . The arbitrary scaling of responses has for instance been demonstrated by the fact that initial responses are often nearly insensitive to the size or scope of a stimulus (Ariely et al., 2003) .
Economists have replicated many of the choice anomalies observed in psychological experiments (Boyle et al., 1985; Kahneman et al., 1999; McFadden, 1999) . A particularly wellexamined anomaly in preference elicitation is the phenomenon of "anchoring" effects. Stated willingness to pay for unfamiliar goods has been found to be strongly influenced by arbitrary anchors such as by dollar amounts presented in dichotomous choice questions (Green et al., 1998) , or even by figures the respondents themselves had derived from their social security card numbers (Ariely et al., 2003) .
However, experimental economists have argued that various forms of "institutions" and "learning" may transform or eliminate choice anomalies. Frey and Eichenberger (1994) argue that the frequency of anomalous actions is endogenous and influenced by social processes.
People may need time to learn optimal decisions (Camerer, 1995) . Cherry et al. (2003) and Hanley and Shogren (2005) argue that that learning on private good markets may spill over to choices about public goods. List (2006) reports that market settings reduced the willingness to pay/willingness to accept disparity even in choices about "unfamiliar" private goods. Slembeck and Tyran (2004) found that competition and communication among individuals -and specifically learning from better informed individuals -entirely eliminated choice anomalies in their experiment.
Political scientists have shown that many voters in direct legislation decisions are uninformed to the point of ignorance about public policy, politics and government in general.
Nevertheless, the consequences of voter ignorance continue to be debated. Kuklinksy et al. (1982) found that relatively uninformed voters looked to reference groups more than others in deciding how to vote. McKelvey and Ordeshook (1986) identify group endorsement as a potential source of information for imperfectly informed voters.
1 Lupia (1994) argues that voters can use information about the preferences or opinions of others such as friends, co-workers, political parties or other organisations to emulate the behavior of relatively well-informed citizens. He corroborates his arguments with the results of an exit poll in which he surveyed
California voters who were confronted by five complex propositions regarding the regulation of the insurance industry. Based on an exit poll, Lupia found that a large group of voters who possessed relatively low levels of factual knowledge about the initiatives but could correctly identify the insurance industry's preferences on a particular proposition were much more likely to emulate the behavior of relatively well-informed voters on that propositions than were similarly uninformed voters who did not know the insurance industry's position. Lupia and McCubbins (1998) discuss the dynamics of these information signals in the broader context of strategic models of communication known as "signalling" games (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986 ). Lupia and Matsusaka (2004) observe that not all providers of information in elections are trustworthy or knowledgeable. However, voters have an incentive to seek advice from people who are credible and to avoid information from those who provide vague or unreliable advice.
1 See Grossman and Helpman (1999, p. 503f.) for a review of the theoretical literature on political endorsements.
Institutions such as truth-in-advertising laws, effective channels of communication and competitive political environments provide a strong incentive to publicly expose misleading signals.
In the literature on stated preferences, public referenda have played an important role as a guide for survey design (Arrow et al., 1993; Hanemann, 1994) . Problems with information provision and respondent uncertainty constitute a substantial part of the extensive literature (Blomquist and Whitehead, 1998; Munro and Hanley, 1999) . The fact that voters in elections use other sources of information in addition to official voter guides has also been noted in the contingent valuation literature (Diamond and Hausman, 1994, p. 60; Hanemann, 1994, p. 28; Baron, 1996, p. 148; Shapiro and Deacon, 1996) . However, although decision-makers in the public sector are increasingly relying on stated preference methods to provide signals of value, the effects of political signals on individuals' stated preference for public goods have not been examined to date. The sole exception is a recent study by Schläpfer et al. (2004) who examine effects of political endorsements in an attribute-based choice experiment. The present study extends that research to a contingent valuation setting.
Experimental Design
In a real-world ballot proposition it would be difficult to experimentally control information provision. However, in an appropriately designed survey setting, access to political signals such as policy endorsements from diverse political parties and interest groups can be experimentally controlled. To experimentally isolate the effects of information shortcuts on voter behavior we conduct a two-stage experiment. We develop a referendum-format stated-preference survey questionnaire and, based on this questionnaire, solicit (negative or positive) endorsements from political parties and relevant interest groups. We then conduct a mail survey in which we include a table listing the endorsements with a subsample (one half) of the questionnaires. To allow an interesting additional interpretation of the results, we orthogonally cross the information treatment with a treatment Green et al. (1998) used to detect "anchoring" effects in survey responses. Table 1 - Table 1 about here -
The policy proposition of the contingent valuation survey was concerned with measures to prevent land abandonment followed by spontaneous reforestation in the Swiss Alps. 2 The proposition was to provide increased tax-financed incentive payments to mountain farmers who continue to manage their marginal lands and thus contribute to the public-good benefits of maintaining a diverse cultivated landscape. The questionnaire, in addition to a title page, consisted of four pages. The first page contained information about past and current land-use changes in the Swiss Alps, particularly with regard to the forest area and to agricultural land-use.
This included a small map showing the percentage increase in forest area over a twelve-year period for each of the central, the south-western and the south-eastern region of the Alps.
Respondents were given information about possible positive and negative consequences of a decline of mountain agriculture and further increase of forest area. The following page asked questions about general attitudes toward these changes and about the amount of time spent in the Swiss Alps. On the third page, the subjects were confronted with a hypothetical policy proposition which implied a specified increase in taxes in the case of majority approval. In a first, dichotomous-choice (DC) question, the respondents were asked if they would vote in favor of this proposition. In a second, open-ended question, they were asked to state the maximum amount (in SFR) at which they would vote for the proposition. This question sequence follows Green et al. (1998) as mentioned above. The presentation of the two valuation questions is illustrated in Fig. 1 of the Appendix. Compared with standard contingent valuation surveys, an important peculiarity of our DC question is that the cost consequence of the proposition was specified as a percentage increase in taxes. This specification was necessary to be able to subsequently collect endorsements from parties and interest groups. by mail rather than passing by the ballot boxes in person. 4 The target individuals were selected in a two-stage process to obtain a sample that corresponded well with the structure of the sampled population. First, random samples were drawn from the list of telephone numbers in the survey areas. The household structure was then surveyed, yielding number, age, and gender of all potential respondents in the household (citizens with the right to vote). A random sample of individuals was then drawn from the potential target members of the households. Households were contacted five times (on different days) before target respondents were replaced. A computer-assisted algorithm for selecting replacements ensured that the age and sex distribution in the sample remained close to census distributions.
Hypotheses
The experimental design allows us to test a number of specific hypotheses regarding the effect of the political signals on the survey responses. First, we examine if the information shortcuts affected the questionnaire return rates (hypothesis H1). Second, we test if the information shortcuts affect the (unconditional) distribution of the responses among the categories "yes", "no" and "missing" in the DC question, and among the categories "positive", "zero", "slash" (/)
and "missing" in the OE question (H2). Third, we use multiple regression to examine how the information treatment and the 'bid' level (coded as dummy variables) affect the probability of a
Yes response in the DC question and stated WTP value in the OE question. In a model with the pooled data, we thus test if the coefficients on the treatment dummies (and their interaction) are significantly different from zero (H3).
Experimental Results
Of the 773 distributed questionnaires 311 (40.2%) were returned complete. The return rate was not different among the four treatment combinations (see Table 1 ). - Table 2 about here - inconsistency cannot be identified in standard surveys we did not exclude these observations from the sample.
-Tables 3 and 4 about here -
To analyze the responses to the valuation questions in a multiple regression framework, we coded dummy variables for each of the two-level treatment factors. The definitions of the explanatory variables in the regressions are presented in Table 5 . To analyze the responses to the OE question we divided the open-ended WTP amount by the self-reported annual tax bill to obtain the variable "WTP in tax percent". Incredibly high WTP bids, defined as WTP greater than 10 percent of the annual tax bill, were excluded from the analysis. There were eight such responses, three from respondents with access to the endorsements and five from respondents without access to the endorsements. The "slash" (/) and missing responses were interpreted as zero bids. This interpretation seems to be the most appropriate one on the following grounds. this did not change our results.)
- Table 5 about here - Table 6 contains the estimates from regressions of the binary responses to the DC question (probit models) and the OE question (OLS and censored "Tobit" regression) on the treatment dummies, with and without relevant (significant) socioeconomic co-variables. These models encompass direct tests of our hypotheses regarding the impact of the endorsements on the DC and OE responses. The binary (Yes/No) choices were not significantly affected by the treatments (Table 6 , column 1). This result did not change when dummies for gender and high income were added to the model (column 4), although BID × SIGNALS tended to have a positive effect (t=1.46). In the OLS and Tobit models of percentage WTP with only the treatment dummies included as independent variables (Table 6 , columns 2 and 3), BID and SIGNALS had a significant interactive effect on the open-ended WTP responses (columns 2 and 3). This pattern remained unchanged when dummies for gender and high income were added to the model (columns 5 and 6), or when the absolute WTP (instead of the percentage WTP) was used as the dependent variable.
- Table 6 about here -
The effects of BID on the OE responses are effects of "bid-anchoring" as discussed for example in Green et al. (1998) . An important interpretation of the significant interaction between BID and SIGNALS is that this anchoring effect is changed or transformed by the political signals. However, there is an important difference in the interpretation of the BID effect in our two information treatments. In the treatment without access to political signals, the effect of BID is the effect of an arbitrary anchor on the responses to the OE question. In the treatment with information signals, in contrast, the effect of BID is the effect of informative signals or, in other words, of an informative, non-arbitrary anchor.
Regarding the socioeconomic characteristics, male respondents were significantly less The results of the hypothesis tests are summarized in Table 7 .
- Table 7 about here -
Discussion
Several aspects of the results and the experimental approach in general warrant further discussion.
The effects of the political signals on the open-ended WTP responses support the hypothesis and observational findings of political scientists that voters who are confronted with unfamiliar policy propositions may choose to base their decisions on endorsements received from political parties and interest groups. The substantial reduction of item non-reponse suggests that the endorsements reduced information costs and that at least some of the respondents perceived them as helpful for formulating a "satisfactory" response.
The mean effect of political endorsements on open-ended WTP was positive (see Table   4 ). We suggest that this direction of the effect can be partly explained by an asymmetry of the In the treatment without endorsement information we found a larger proportion of Yes responses to the tax increase of 0.2 percent than to the tax increase of 1 percent as expected (0.47 vs. 0.36; see Table 2 ), but this difference was not significant in the test (Table 6 ). While insensitivity to the bid level is often seen as evidence of a flawed study, such interpretations must clearly take the specific bid design into account. The bid levels in the present study varied by a factor of five while CV studies on tax-financed public goods often use experimental designs that vary the bid by a factor of one hundred or more. It is clear that designs which unlike our design include extremely high bids (relative to the income of the respondent) will be more likely to produce significant effects of the bid level. In the treatment with endorsements, the proportion of Yes responses was slightly smaller with the smaller tax increase than with the larger tax increase (0.43 vs. 0.49; non-significant). This finding suggests that, within the range of tax increases used, the endorsements may not have helped the respondents in formulating rational responses to the DC question. However, it seems fair to say that the effect of the tax increase would likely be different with tax increases varying by a factor of one hundred -and related party information.
5
Using tax percentages is a precondition for the parties to be able to provide endorsements for a tax-financed public good (see section Experimental design). Valuation in a rational model then somehow involves the translation of tax percentages (or changes in a public budget) into personal tax consequences. The conversion table provided in the valuation question had precisely the purpose of guiding the respondent in this inevitable task. We thus used absolute amounts in the open-ended question only after introducing the respondent to the correspondence between percentages and individual-specific amounts. Once the respondent is aware of this correspondence, a WTP in absolute amounts may be easier to formulate than a WTP in tax percentages. However, we do not want to suggest that this was the best way to proceed.
Exploring alternative procedures would seem to be an important topic for future research.
The specification of the costs as a percentage (rather than absolute) increase in taxes may have far-reaching consequences for the credibility and strategic incentives of stated preference questions (Flores and Strong, in press; Schläpfer, 2006; Schläpfer and Hanley, 2006) . By this formulation we essentially prevented that the public good was offered to high (low) incomes at incredibly low (high) costs. This sets the control of our information treatment clearly apart from standard contingent valuation formats. The observed effects of the information treatment may thus not be generalized to surveys using a standard 'bid' design.
Our results are relevant for future research on stated preferences for public goods. The reduced frequency of non-responses under the treatment with endorsements suggests that this information treatment may reduce problems with respondent uncertainty in notoriously difficult 5 One reviewer suggested an interesting alternative interpretation of the insignificant bid amount: "You change taxes and you change the good. For this reason demand as opposed to willingness to pay is being measured. A higher proportional tax rate increase may be preferred over a lower if it is closer to my bliss point (individually preferred tax increase).
[…] If the exact number of acres covered was the same across the two bid amounts, then I would say willingness to pay is being measured. If instead the acres covered is not explicit, I would have to infer that higher taxes means more acres." This interpretation seems plausible, but we would suggest that a similar interpretation might also apply to standard question formats where the bid is specified as an absolute dollar amount.
decisions and may hence reduce well-known empirical symptoms of respondent uncertainty such as insensitivity to scope, part-whole bias, and anchoring effects. The significant interaction of the information and 'bid' level treatments specifically suggests that political endorsements in a survey setting have the potential to "crowd out" anomalous anchoring effects by replacing arbitrary anchors with informative political signals.
Regarding the applied use of contingent valuation for benefit-cost analysis, our experiment demonstrates that it is possible to conduct field surveys in which respondents have access to a similar type of political signals as voters have in direct legislation decisions. To those policy-makers who seek information about individuals' preferences for public goods, the endorsements themselves and their effect on survey responses may provide valuable additional information about the likely preferences and support for proposed policies outside the restrictive information environment of standard stated preference approaches. Our approach thus holds considerable promise for applied research in nonmarket valuation.
Conclusion
Compared to exit polls, laboratory experiments and standard contingent valuation surveys, our contingent valuation approach with political endorsements combines the advantages of a controlled experimental setting with a social context and information environment that is similar Some may argue that the stated preferences we elicit at best mimic, rather than reveal, "true" preferences. We agree. However, as Ariely et al. (2003) demonstrate, even choices about private goods may often be "anchored" in prices and other signals from competitive markets.
Seen in this light, the best we can do in preference elicitation is to ensure that the respondents have access to informative rather than misleading anchors. If we achieve this by providing endorsements from reputable, accountable political actors, then survey responses about public goods may be as firmly grounded in "true" preferences as many of our routine choices about private goods in the markets. Note: *,**,*** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics; for significance levels see Table 3 . 
Question 4
Imagine the following national ballot proposition:
Through a targeted increase of compensation payments to farmers, the continued agricultural use of the current meadows and pastures in the mountainous regions will be secured. With this measure, a further forest expansion will be stopped. The payments will be financed through taxes: In consequence, your annual tax bill (municipal, cantonal and direct federal taxes) increases by 0.2 percent. The 
